In my continuing effort to shine a light on the forgotten past of conservative politics, I'd like to share some of the thoughts and writings of Senator Robert Taft, the die-hard conservative and sworn enemy of New Deal Socialism. Taft's strong conservative credentials led to him being the definition of the Republican Party itself, being known widely as, "Mr. Republican."
Being a genuine and principled conservative, Taft was attacked by both the Left and Establishment Right, obscuring his positions and ultimately scarring his legacy. As a protector of the Constitution and champion of liberty, he often opposed foreign wars and was therefore labeled (falsely) as an "isolationist" and/or "obstructionist." Further adding insult, the stalwart anti-communist Taft, was labeled a "super-appeaser" who would "execute the foreign policy of Stalin."
Later, as Americans became disillusioned by the Vietnam War, a fresh evaluation of Taft's positions popped-up beginning with Henry W. Berger, who wouldn't accept the idea that Taft was an isolationist, but instead a "conservative nationalist at odds with the struggling attempts of liberal American policy-makers to fashion a program in the postwar years." [1] Columnist Nicholas von Hoffman wrote on Taft's policies calling them "a way to defend the country without destroying it, a way to be part of the world without running it." Russell Kirk praised him as well, arguing that he always pursued "the principle of national interest." [2]
What were Senator Robert Taft's Ideas on Foreign Policy?
Well ... Taft wrote a book in 1951 titled "A Foreign Policy for Americans." In a series of posts, we'll quote extensively from this book, in order to get a better understanding of this ardent draft opponent's "Liberty First" foreign policy.
Chapter Two:
NO ONE can question the fact that the initiative in American foreign policy lies with the President. But, if I can judge from my mail and from many considered editorial expressions, the American people certainly do not believe or intend that his power shall be arbitrary and unrestrained. They want a voice in the more important features of that policy, particularly those relating to peace and war. They expect their Senators and Congressmen to be their voice. Before discussing the correctness of the principles of foreign policy, therefore, I shall try to define the place of Congress and the President under our Constitution. The debates in the Senate in early 1951 had even more to do with the question of who shall determine policy than with policy itself.
There can be no question that the executive departments have claimed more and more power over the field of foreign policy at the same time that the importance of foreign policy and its effect on every feature of American life has steadily increased. If the present trend continues it seems to me obvious that the President will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy and thereby acquire power to force upon Congress all kinds of domestic policies which must necessarily follow.
The fundamental issue in the "great debate" was, and is, whether the President shall decide when the United States shall go to war or whether the people of the United States themselves shall make that decision. Also, for many years the State Department has been developing a theory that almost any action can be taken by executive agreement, which does not absolutely require any congressional approval at all, instead of by the treaty method prescribed in the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the necessity of obtaining a two-thirds vote in the Senate is very difficult and has encouraged many people to think that this development was necessary. But if the treaty method is not satisfactory, then the Constitution should be amended to provide for the approval of all executive agreements and to define the scope of and effect of such agreements much more clearly than at present.
More and more the State Department has assumed to do many things which are beyond its power in the field of trade, by an executive agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). It has insisted that the Executive have the power to raise and lower tariffs, through reciprocal trade agreements, within constantly widening limits and without the slightest shadow of a standard prescribed by law. Political agreements as important as those made at Yalta have never been submitted to Congress at all.
The execution of international agreements, such as the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Pact, has now given rise to extended claims that the President can do anything which can be related to those treaties and anything recommended by the international commissions there created, without any consultation whatever with Congress.
I think it is fair to say that the State Department has adopted an attitude of hostility toward Congress and an unwillingness to submit any matter to Congress if it thinks it can possibly carry it through without such submission. It shows a complete distrust of the opinion of the people, unless carefully nursed by State Department propaganda.
The matter was brought to an issue by the intervention of the President in the Korean War without even telling Congress what he was doing for several weeks. And it was brought still further to the fore by the proposal that we commit troops to an international army under the control of a council of twelve nations. I do not think that the American people have ever faced a more serious constitutional issue or one which in the end may present a greater threat to their freedom.
In the long run, the question which the country must decide involves vitally not only the freedom of the people of the United States but the peace of the people of the United States. More and more, as the world grows smaller, we are involved in problems of foreign policy. If in the great field of foreign policy the President has the arbitrary and unlimited powers he now claims, then there is an end to freedom in the United States not only in the foreign field but in the great realm of domestic activity which necessarily follows any foreign commitments. The area of freedom at home becomes very circumscribed indeed.
If the President has unlimited power to involve us in war, then I believe that the consensus of opinion is that war is more likely. History shows that when the people have the opportunity to speak they as a rule decide for peace if possible. It shows that arbitrary rulers are more inclined to favor war than are the people at any time. This question has become of tremendous importance, perhaps greater than any particular problem of troops to Europe or the manner in which the Korean War shall be conducted. The claims made by the President of the United States and by various documents presented to the Senate by the executive representatives far exceed the powers claimed by President Roosevelt during World War II, those claimed by President Truman when the United Nations Charter was passed, and those claimed by President Truman when the Atlantic Pact was adopted.
On January 4, last, President Truman, commenting on the Coudert resolution to bar him from sending more troops to Europe without the consent of Congress, said emphatically that he did not need the permission of Congress to take such action.
On January 11, at a press interview, according to the Washington Post:
"Mr. Truman, whose right to send troops to Europe recently was challenged by Senator Taft, said he had the power to send them any place in the world. This, he said, had been repeatedly recognized by Congress and the Supreme Court.
"A reporter asked Mr. Truman in effect what would happen if Congress tried to tie his hands by putting restrictions in the appropriation bills for the forces to be sent to Europe.
"That, said the President, was up to Congress. If they wanted to go to the country about it, he said, he would go with them - and he recalled that he licked them once."
At the President's conference a week later, on January 18, according to the press:
"He repeated that his constitutional authority to send American forces to Europe to take up their positions in an integrated European army was clear and did not depend upon the consent of Congress. What he would be glad to have, he said in substance, was a Senate expression that affirmed his constitutional authority."
Furthermore, a document was submitted to Congress, entitled Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States, dated February 28, 1951, which was printed, though not endorsed, by the Joint Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate. This document contains the most unbridled claims for the authority of the President that I have ever seen written in cold print. In effect, the document asserts that whenever in his opinion American foreign policy requires he may send troops to any point whatsoever in the world, no matter what the war in which the action may involve us. The document also claims that in sending armed forces to carry out a treaty the President does not require any statutory authority whatever, and it does not recognize the difference between a self-executing treaty and one which requires, even by its own terms, congressional authority. It ends with the most sweeping claims for power:
As this discussion of the respective powers of the President and the Congress in this field has made clear, constitutional doctrine has been largely molded by practical necessities. Use of the Congressional power to declare war, for example, has fallen into abeyance because wars are no longer declared in advance. The Constitutional power of the Commander in Chief has been exercised more often, because the need for armed international action has grown more acute. The long delays occasioned by the slowness of communications in the eighteenth century have given place to breathtaking rapidity in the tempo of history. Repelling aggression in Korea or Europe cannot wait upon Congressional debate. However, while the need for speed and the growth in the size and complexity of the armed forces have enlarged the area in which the powers of the Commander in Chief are to be wielded, the magnitude of present-day military operations and international policies requires a degree of Congressional support that was unnecessary in the days of the nineteenth century.
That seems a very gracious concession to Congress. Congress no longer has any power to act. It is simply given the right to support the President after the President has acted. I was shocked in the very beginning of this controversy by the speed with which blind partisans in the administration rushed to the defense of the proposition that the President can make war and warlike commitments. Senator Connally, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made this extraordinary assertion on the floor of the Senate:
"The scope of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief to send the Armed Forces to any place required by the security interests of the United States has often been questioned, but never denied by authoritative opinion."
That certainly is a complete misrepresentation of the discussion of these constitutional powers which has taken place since the foundation of the nation.
"Mr. Republican's" foreign policy positions were far from naive, and his critique of growth in the powers of the Executive Branch should be taken seriously. Taft always maintained that individual liberty and rule of law were the most potent weapon against our enemies. Not State power.
In our next post, we'll look at his philosophy of putting liberty first.
Additional Source Info:
- Henry W. Berger, "A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early Cold War Program," in David Horowitz (ed.), Containment and Revolution (Boston, 1967), 132-39.
- Russell Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft (New York, 1967), 158-61.
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